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 CHAPTER 2 
 Analysing Civil Society in Weak States 
 To explore how civil society constitutes itself in weak states and how the 
state and other factors, such as a country’s historical legacy, its political sys-
tem, its ethnic composition, its majority religion, or its level of economic 
growth, infl uence the development of national civil societies, this study 
takes the empirical, analytical literature on civil society as a starting point 
(e.g. Alexander  1998 ; Guan  2004 ; Lauth  2003 ; Lewis  2001 ; Wischermann 
 2005 ). Notably, this literature suggests that the concept of civil society 
must be systematically contextualized. A  relational understanding that 
consequently relates civil society to the context of action in which it oper-
ates is a fruitful approach to this endeavour (Lorch  2006 ). Building on 
the works of Alexander ( 1998 , pp. 7f.),  Gosewinkel ( 2003 ), Gosewinkel 
and Rucht ( 2004 ), Gosewinkel et al. ( 200 4 ) and Croissant et al. ( 2000 , 
pp. 11ff.), such a relational approach assumes that in real, existing civil 
societies, normative characteristics, such as “civility”, the generation of 
social capital and the performance of certain democratic functions, can 
exist only  in degrees . Concurrently, the relational approach likewise sup-
poses that real, existing civil societies will also always display certain dark 
sides, such as clientelism and organizational hierarchies, and that the rela-
tionship between the democratic features and dark sides within such real, 
existing civil societies depends on the scope of action available to civil 
society actors. 
 When analysing national civil societies in particular countries, the rela-
tional approach selects the civil society groups to be studied on the basis 
of the broad, predominantly empirical defi nition of the CCS-LSE ( 2006 ), 
which encompasses a large variety of associations that can  differ tremen-
dously in terms of their organizational characteristics. It then proceeds 
to describe how these civil society groups constitute themselves within, 
and because of, their specifi c empirical context, and to what extent they 
are characterized by democratic features and dark sides, respectively. 
More specifi cally, it can be assumed that real, existing civil society groups 
will always display a certain degree of autonomy from the state,  political 
 society and the market and can, therefore, be characterized by a certain 
extent of self-organization and self-regulation. As far as their internal 
organizational structures are concerned, civil society groups are likely to 
show a certain commitment towards horizontal forms of decision-making 
and practise some measure of accountability and transparency. Similarly, 
they can, to a certain degree, be assumed to be inclusive and pluralistic in 
nature and to bridge social cleavages. Accordingly, real, existing civil soci-
eties, in this sense, can be expected to be characterized by a certain degree 
of “civility” and, to a certain extent, to  perform democratic functions , such 
 as watchdog and representative functions or the  generation of social capital . 
Similarly, they may, to a certain degree, act as  democratic intermediaries , 
conveying the needs and interests of marginalized social groups to the 
state (e.g. Anheier et al.  2000 ;  Anheier et al.  2003 , esp. p. 137; Cohen 
and Arato  1992 ;  Diamond 1999, pp. 228–250; Putnam  1993 ; Priller and 
Zimmer  2003 ) . 1 At the same time, however, the autonomy of real, exist-
ing civil society groups is always bound to be limited and, depending on 
the context in which they operate, the internal structures of civil society 
organizations may also display unrepresentative, exclusive and hierarchi-
cal features. Moreover, in real-world settings, civil society groups can be 
tainted with varying degrees of informality, clientelism, or even violence. 
The social capital they generate may also be particularistic, at least to a 
certain extent. Consequently, it can be assumed that a vibrant civil  society 
is not always good for democracy (e.g. Lauth  2003 ; Monga  2009 ; Ottaway 
 2004 ; Roniger  1998 ; Verkoren and van Leeuwen  2014 ). 
 Moreover, the empirical, analytical literature on civil society also suggests 
that both the relationship between the democratic features and the dark 
sides of real, existing civil societies and the relationship between the internal 
organizational structures and the democratic potential of civil society groups 
are complex in nature. For example, Alexander ( 1998 , pp. 7f) has argued 
that where there is a high degree of “interpenetration” between the sphere 
of civil society and the state (or other social spheres, such the market), the 
resulting lack of autonomy of civil society can lead to the emergence of 
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“non-civil” forms of behaviour within the sphere of civil society. Similarly, 
several empirically oriented studies show that civil society groups whose 
internal organizational structures are hierarchical and do not allow for active 
involvement of their members in decision-making often fail to perform a 
representative function and are frequently unable to contribute to popular 
participation (e.g. Edwards and Hulme  1996a ,  b ; Tandon  1996 ). Under 
certain conditions, however, so-called dark sides, such as a lack of internally 
democratic structures, may also enable civil society actors to perform certain 
democratic functions. Rueschemeyer ’s ( 1998 , pp. 13f.; 16 )  refl ections on 
the relationship between internal organization and organizational effective-
ness suggest , for instance, that  especially   where the social and political sys-
tem is exclusive, hierarchically structured groups may sometimes be more 
effective in the struggle for a widening of avenues for popular representa-
tion than internally democratic ones. Similarly, German transition theory 
fi nds that the readiness of civil society actors to militantly oppose exist-
ing power structures can play an important role in making a democratic 
transition succeed. Once democracy is established, however, such militant 
modes of behaviour may weaken democratic institutions and prevent civil 
society from serving an intermediary function between citizens and the state 
(Croissant  2000 , pp. 354 –62 .;  see also  Croissant et al.  2000 ). 
2.1   THE STATE AS THE CONTEXT OF ACTION FOR CIVIL 
SOCIETY 
 The  relational approach suggests that the relationship between the dem-
ocratic potential and the dark sides of civil society is contextually con-
tingent. But what are the contextual conditions that can be expected to 
be most relevant in shaping national civil societies? As noted earlier, the 
existing literature has identifi ed various factors that may infl uence national 
civil societies, including, in particular, a country’s historical legacy, its 
political system, its ethnic composition and majority religion, its level 
of economic growth and the strength or weakness of the state. A quick 
comparison of Bangladesh and the Philippines, following a  most dissimi-
lar cases design , suggests, however, that the relative strength or weakness 
of the state constitutes the most important condition that infl uences the 
ability of civil society to emerge, exert political infl uence and contribute 
to democratization. This preliminary empirical fi nding is supported by 
several works that touch upon the relationship between civil society and 
the state (e.g. Götze  2004 ; Gosewinkel  2003 , pp.  1, 9ff;  Gosewinkel 
et al.  2004 , p. 14f., 18–21; Englehardt  2011 ; Evans et al.  1985 ; Kaviraj 
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 2001 , pp. 366ff.; Knöbl  2006 ; Reichardt  2004 , pp. 65–68; Rueschemeyer 
 1998 , esp. pp. 18f.; Rueschemeyer et al.  1998a , pp. 4ff.; Stepan  1985 ; 
Weiss and Hobson  1995 ; pp. 1–10, 238–252). Weiss and Hobson, for 
instance, stress the  causal primacy of the state in shaping the develop-
ment of civil society (Weiss and Hobson  1995 , pp. 1–10, 238–252), and 
Kaviraj ( 2001 , pp. 366ff.) points to the pre-eminent role played by the 
(post-)colonial state in structuring civil societies in developing countries. 
Similarly, Gosewinkel ( 2003 , pp. 9ff.) has noted that, depending on its 
specifi c character, the state can constitute either an enabling condition for 
or an impediment to the emergence and existence of civil society. 
 But what kind of state produces what kind of civil society? Englehardt 
( 2011 , p. 337) argues that common theories of civil society, which build 
on liberal democratic theory and were infl uenced by the historical experi-
ence of the democratic transformations in Eastern Europe, tend to view 
“civil society as spontaneously self-organized harmony”. Civil society, in 
this sense, is perceived as a bulwark against despotic state power and is 
supposed to fl ourish best when the state interferes least. Drawing on the-
oretical considerations, the case of Somalia and available cross- national 
data, Englehardt  ( 2011 ) refutes these assumptions. Instead, he proposes 
an alternative, Kantian view of civil society according to which a harmo-
nious civil society can emerge only after the state has reduced violence 
and established centralized control over predatory groups. The develop-
ment of a strong and “civil” civil society, in this sense, requires a strong 
state . Ultimately, Englehardt argues, this fi nding is also confi rmed by the 
democratic transformations in Eastern Europe, where strong and demo-
cratically oriented civil societies emerged in authoritarian states that were, 
however, strong and centralized (ibid, pp. 356f.) 2 . This corresponds with 
the  neo-statist approach, advanced by Weiss and Hobson ( 1995 , pp. 1–10, 
238–252), which assumes that strong states and strong civil societies con-
stitute two sides of the same coin. The conclusion that a strong and demo-
cratic civil society requires a strong state is also shared by other authors who 
have focused on the relationship between civil society and the strength, or 
weakness, of the state. For instance, Götze’s ( 200 4 , pp. 201ff.) work on 
the Red Cross in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania also shows the impor-
tance of the state’s monopoly on the use of force and the existence of a reli-
able legal framework for the emergence of a civil society that is strong and 
democratic. Götze argues that civil society in this sense is legally enabled, 
framed and protected by the state, and that by holding a monopoly on 
force and by establishing binding rules for social behaviour a strong state 
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constitutes  an important precondition for an autonomous and non-violent 
civil society to emerge (see  also Gosewinkel et al.  2004 , pp. 14f.; 18–21; 
Knöbl  2006 ; Reichardt  200 4 , pp.  65–68 ). 
 However, Götze ( 200 4 , pp. 201ff.) also states that to conclude that 
civil society can only exist in strong states would be misleading, because 
in many developing countries voluntary associations fl ourish precisely 
because the state is weak. This view is shared by other authors who focus on 
the development of civil society in weak states and in the developing world 
more generally (e.g. Croissant et al.  2000 ; Lorch  2006 ,  2008 ; Ottaway 
 2004 , p. 125; Shah  2008 ). The research on governance in areas of limited 
statehood also supports this view, showing that in contexts where central 
state institutions are weak, civil society actors, such as NGOs, often take 
over functions normally ascribed to the state (e.g. Risse  2012 , pp. 5ff.). 
 This apparent paradox is unravelled by Ottaway ( 2004 ) who shows 
that, while in many weak states civil society groups exist in abundance, 
they often constitute themselves differently from what is assumed by nor-
mative civil society theory. Specifi cally, Ottaway ’s analysis suggests that 
civil society groups operating in weak states  may often lack autonomy 
from powerful social forces and frequently engage in rather uncivil forms 
of behaviour. This fi nding corresponds with other studies on civil society 
in weak states, which likewise suggest that so-called dark sides characterize 
civil society especially in contexts where the state is weak (e.g. Englehardt 
 2011 ; Götze  2004 ; Lorch  2006 ,  2008 ; Shah  2008 ). 
 But how exactly does state weakness lead to the emergence of dark 
sides in civil society? The few existing theoretical investigations into this 
issue often revolve around the state’s monopoly on the use of force (e.g. 
Englehardt  2011 ; Götze  200 4 ; Knöbl  2006 ; Reichardt  200 4 ). More pre-
cisely, it has been argued that the centralization of the means of violence 
in the hands of the state leads to pacifi cation, creates social order and gen-
erates predictability, thereby enabling the development of voluntary asso-
ciational activities (Englehardt  2011 , pp. 338ff.; see also Reichardt  200 4 , 
pp.  65–68 ). Similarly, it has been noted that the state’s monopoly on 
force, compulsory education, conscription and taxation  have a  disciplinary 
effect on society, because  they lead to social affect control and promote 
the sublimation of aggressions (Götze  200 4 , p. 201; Knöbl  2006 , pp. 4ff.; 
Reichardt  200 4 , pp. 62–6 8 ). In this sense, the varying degrees of “civility” 
of different national civil societies can be seen to depend on the extent to 
which the states in which they operate manage to uphold a monopoly on 
force (Gosewinkel et al.  2004 , pp. 18 –21 .; Knöbl  2006 , pp. 1–7; Leonhard 
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 2004 ; Reichardt  200 4 , pp.  65–68 .). On the whole, however, existing 
studies have not been able to suffi ciently operationalize these theoretical 
fi ndings in order to explain how state weakness may generate the various 
different types of dark sides that real, existing civil societies have been found 
to display. 
 To solve this problem, the present study disaggregates the phenom-
enon of state weakness and also examines the social and political condi-
tions in which weak state institutions are embedded. Specifi cally, the 
literatures on governance in areas of limited statehood and on weak 
states show that the prevalence of an environment in which non-state 
actors perform functions normally ascribed to the state (e.g. Beisheim 
et  al.  2014 ; Riss e  2015 ), the existence of powerful social forces that 
compete with the central state for social control (see especially Migdal 
 1988 ), the widespread use of patronage and corruption by state elites 
and powerful non-state actors (e.g. Eriksen  2005 ), the prevalence of a 
context of violence and insecurity (e.g. Biró  2007 ; Schneckener  2006 ) 
and external infl uences in the form of international aid (e.g. Carothers 
and Ottaway  2000 ) are highly interrelated with the weakness of central 
state authorities. Interestingly, the few existing studies on civil society 
in weak states (e.g. Englehardt  2011 ; Götze  2003 ; Lorch  2006 ,  2008 ; 
Shah  2008 ; Verkoren and van Leeuwen  2014 ) and the broader empirical 
analytical literature on civil society (e.g. Alexander  1998 ;  Croissant et al. 
 2000 ; Lauth  2003 ; Roniger  1998 ) have also identifi ed these conditions 
as having an important impact on national civil societies. Drawing on 
this, the book investigates whether and how these conditions infl uence 
civil society in weak states. In order to specify these further, the study 
also draws on previous scholarship on state-society relations in “weak” 
or “soft” states (e.g. Migdal  1988 ; Myrdal  1968 ), as well as on the lit-
eratures on patronage (e.g. Landé  1977 ; Lemarchand  1981 ; Scott and 
Kerkvliet  1977 ), on violent non-state actors (e.g. Biró  2007 ; Mair  2002 ; 
Schneckener  2009 ) and on foreign-funded NGOs (e.g. Banks et  al. 
 2015 ; Banks and Hulme  2012 ; Edwards and Hulme  1996a ,  b ). 
 Building on analytical categories that can be found in both the litera-
ture on civil society, and in the literatures on governance in areas of limited 
statehood and on weak states, the theoretical analytical framework, which 
guides the empirical analysis of this book, constitutes a “focused theory 
frame” following Rueschemeyer ( 2009 , pp. 12–17 ). As such, the frame-
work cuts across the research on civil society, on governance in areas of 
limited statehood and on weak states, and structures the book’s theoretical 
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and empirical investigation into the relationship between civil society and 
state weakness. However, while “theory frames” have a sharp focus and 
constitute highly effective “analytical tool s ”, they do not constitute com-
prehensive theories ( ibid ). Consequently, the book’s theoretical analytical 
framework also falls short of determining the multiple connections and 
interrelations that might exist  between the analytical categories and tenta-
tive causal patterns it identifi es. Moreover, to ensure that its fi ndings can 
be generalized on a higher theoretical level, the present study must com-
bine the application of its “focused theory frame” with the Comparative 
Method in the form of the  most dissimilar cases design and with structured, 
focused comparison. 
 The following sub-chapters develop the fi ve analytical categories of 
infl uences that shape civil society in weak states: fi rst, the existence of an 
environment where non-state actors perform functions normally ascribed 
the state ( Sub-chap .  2.2 ); second, the lack of state autonomy and the 
prevalence of a social confl ict between different alternative power centres 
inside and outside the state apparatus ( Sub-chap .  2.3 ); third, the exis-
tence of a context of patronage and corruption ( Sub-chap .  2.4 ); fourth, 
the prevalence of an environment of violence and insecurity ( Sub-chap . 
 2.5 ); and, fi fth, external infl uences in the form of international aid, which 
are conceptualized as an important intervening variable that can have an 
impact on both civil society and the state ( Sub-chap .  2.6 ). Specifi cally, 
the following theoretical sections will focus on the infl uence that these 
contextual conditions can have on the ability of national civil societies 
to emerge, exert political infl uence and contribute to democratization. 
Throughout the book, the infl uence that other possible independent 
variables, such as the country’s historical legacy, its political system, its 
ethnic composition, its majority religion or its level of economic growth, 
may have on national civil societies is tested empirically through com-
parative methods. 
 As noted, the empirically oriented literature on civil society suggests 
that real, existing civil societies generally mirror the contexts in which 
they operate (e.g. Croissant  2000 , esp. p. 360 ; Howell  1999 ; Lauth  2003 , 
pp. 40ff.). Taking this as a starting point, the following theoretical and 
empirical analysis builds on the  guiding assumption that national civil soci-
eties in weak states mirror the defi cits of their respective states across the above- 
mentioned categories of state weakness . 
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2.2   CIVIL SOCIETY IN A CONTEXT WHERE NON-STATE 
ACTORS PERFORM FUNCTIONS NORMALLY ASCRIBED 
TO THE STATE 
 Existing studies on civil society in weak states have found that in such con-
texts civil society actors often take over functions normally ascribed to the 
state, such as the provision of welfare services (e.g. Götze  200 4 , pp. 201ff.; 
Lorch  2006 ,  2008 ; Ottaway  2004 ; Rombouts  2006 , p. 32; Shah  2008 , 
p. 39; Verkoren and van Leeuwen  2014 , p. 469; Weijer and Kilnes  2012 , 
pp. 12ff.; Zaidi  2006 , p. 3557). Similarly, the literature on governance 
in areas of limited statehood shows that, where central state institutions 
are weak, essential collective goods are often provided by different types 
of non-state actors, including private businesses, public-private partner-
ships or NGOs and other civil society groups (e.g. Beisheim et al.  2014 , 
pp. 3ff.; Risse  2012 , pp. 5ff.). This fi nding is supported by scholarship on 
weak states, which argues that if the state fails to perform its functions with 
regard to the provision of social services, security or other political goods, 
other actors can move into the gaps that exist (e.g. Milliken and Krause 
 2003 , p.  15; Rotberg  2004 , pp.  6ff.; Schneckener  2006 ). Against this 
backdrop,  this sub-chapter explores the relationship between the existence 
of an environment in which non-state actors perform functions normally 
associated with the state and the ability of national civil societies to con-
stitute themselves. 
 The existing literature on civil society in weak states clearly suggests 
that the inability or unwillingness of the state to perform certain func-
tions and the subsequent self-help efforts of local communities to provide 
makeshift solutions to the resulting problems can be highly conducive to 
the emergence of civil society (e.g. Götze  200 4 , pp. 201ff.; Lorch  2006 , 
 2008 ; Ottaway  2004 ; Shah  2008 , p. 39; Zaidi  2006 , p. 3557). But what 
are the specifi c functions that can be assumed by civil society actors, and 
what are the specifi c sectors in which civil society is most likely to emerge 
in contexts of state weakness? 
 Studies that rely on a functional understanding of state weakness largely 
fall short of illuminating the social and political conditions that infl uence 
national civil societies in weak states. However, they delineate and describe 
the functions that are normally attributed to modern states and can thus be 
used to identify the sectors in which civil society actors may become active 
in contexts of state weakness. Specifi cally, many of these studies identify 
three core functions that are normally associated with the state: fi rst, the 
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delivery of social services; second, democratic institution-building; and, 
third, the provision of security (e.g. Doornbos  2003 ; Milliken and Krause 
 2003 ; Rotberg  2002 ,  2004 ; Schneckener  2006 ). To what extent are civil 
society actors capable of performing these functions if the state is unable 
or unwilling to do so? 
 There is a relatively broad consensus in the existing literature on civil 
society in weak states that civil society groups can provide makeshift solu-
tions in the fi eld of social service provision. Civil society actors, such as 
community-based associations, NGOs or religious groups, can cater to 
fundamental welfare needs not met by the state, such as the provision 
of food, healthcare or education (Götze  200 4 , pp. 201ff.; Lorch  2006 , 
 2008 ; Ottaway  2004 ; Shah  2008 , p. 39; Verkoren and van Leeuwen  2014 , 
p. 468; Zaidi  2006 , p. 3557). As Ottaway points out, if civil society orga-
nizations have access to suffi cient resources, they can develop into profes-
sional agencies that may deliver welfare services more effectively than weak 
state bureaucracies. As such, in many weak states, civil society groups con-
stitute the most important providers of welfare services (Ottaway  2004 , 
p. 129). Notably, studies on civil society under authoritarian rule suggest 
that this can be the case even if the political system is highly authoritarian 
(e.g. Croissant et al.  2000 , pp. 28f.; Lorch  2006 ,  2008 ). 
 But how do civil society groups active in the welfare sector relate to the 
institutions and the bureaucratic elites of the weak state? In strong states, 
civil society–based welfare organizations often form part of mixed-welfare 
systems, complementing social service delivery by the state. Moreover, 
where central state institutions are strong, the delivery of social services by 
civil society is usually coordinated, monitored and regulated by the state 
(e.g. Evers and Laville  2004 ; Lamping et al.  2002 ; Lewis  2004 ). By con-
trast, in contexts where the bureaucratic institutions of  the   state are weak, 
the delivery of social services may simply be  left to NGOs and other civil 
society groups without any kind of coordination or supervision (Ottaway 
 2004 , p.  131; see also Edwards and Hulme  1996a , p.  5). Sometimes, 
mixed-welfare systems and contracting-out arrangements may formally 
be in place in weak states as well. But if regulatory state institutions lack 
capacity and the political environment is characterized by patronage and 
corruption, such systems of complementary service provision may become 
severely distorted (e.g. Smith  2004 , esp. pp. 166f. ). However, the ques-
tion of how this may infl uence civil society groups active in the welfare 
sector has not yet been suffi ciently explored. 
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 The existing research on civil society also shows that the capacity of citi-
zens to participate in voluntary associations is dependent on their socio- 
economic and educational backgrounds (e.g. Lamping et al.  2002 , p. 20; 
Reichardt  200 4 , p.  74). More specifi cally,  where comprehensive welfare 
provision  and broad-based access to education  are not in place, civil soci-
ety groups  may often   be unrepresentative in nature and exclude citizens 
belonging to marginalized social strata (e.g. Reichardt  200 4 , pp. 73f.;  see 
also Rueschemeyer  et al.  1998 b; p. 281 ). Ottaway ( 2004 , pp. 128ff.) and 
Shah ( 2008 , p. 35) show that a lack of representativeness and elitist features 
characterize civil society organizations particularly in contexts where the 
state is weak. As Ottaway ( 2004 , p. 129) notes, for instance, in weak states, 
civil society elites frequently make claims  on behalf of certain constituencies 
without being accountable to the latter. Additional research is needed, how-
ever, to clarify to what extent such problematic features can be attributed 
to the weakness of the state and/or the lack of comprehensive social service 
provision, and what role the level of economic development and interna-
tional factors—such as foreign donor infl uences—may play in this regard. 
 As noted earlier, normative approaches to civil society generally sup-
pose that civil society actors are also capable of contributing to democratic 
institution-building. Therefore, international donor programmes aimed 
at the promotion of democracy frequently entail measures to encourage 
civil society growth (e.g. Carothers and de Gramont  2013 , pp.  136ff.; 
Carothers and Ottaway  2000 ). Contrary to this view, the more empiri-
cally analytical literature on civil society is sceptical about the ability of 
civil society to promote democracy. Based on the cases of Bangladesh and 
the Philippines, the questions of whether and to what extent civil society 
actors in weak states are able to exert political infl uence and contribute 
to democratization will be tackled throughout the book, and the answers 
will be presented in the comparative chapter and in the conclusion. In 
addition, the empirical chapters will also explore the question of whether 
civil society can contribute to democratic institution-building by empiri-
cally assessing the contributions that civil society actors in Bangladesh and 
the Philippines have been able (or unable) to make in the fi eld of election 
monitoring. 
 Some authors suggest that in weak states civil society actors may, at 
times, also provide makeshift solutions in the fi eld of security provi-
sion (e.g., Ottaway  2004 , pp. 126f.; see also Andersen  2006 , pp. 15ff.). 
Ottaway ( 2004 , p.  127) claims, for instance, that in contexts of state 
weakness “(v)igilante groups … are a civil society response to insecurity”. 
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Similarly,  Gosewinkel and Reichardt ( 200 4 , p.  65f. )  suggest that   certain 
 violent actors, such as gangs and vigilante groups , are often characterized 
by  organizational features that are suposedly found in civil society as well, 
such as  self-organization and  mutual solidarity   (see also Reichardt 2004, 
p.  69) . However, the ability to effectively provide physical security ulti-
mately depends on a group’s capability to use organized violence, and most 
defi nitions of civil society exclude such groups. Accordingly, many authors 
defi ne vigilante groups not as civil society actors but as non-state armed 
groups (e.g. Schneckener  2009 ). Nevertheless, additional research is neces-
sary to explore the extent to which civil society actors in weak states may be 
able to provide security as well as whether and to what extent they may have 
to link up with or transform themselves into armed groups for this purpose. 
 On a more general level, it must be asked whether civil society groups 
that operate in weak states where the authority of central state institutions 
is contested by powerful non-state actors (e.g. Migdal  1988 ) can perform 
any of the above-mentioned functions independently at all, or whether 
they have to align themselves with state elites or alternative power players 
for this purpose. Conversely, investigating whether non-state power play-
ers trying to increase their social and political infl uence in the weak state 
strive to co-opt civil society groups that deliver social services or other 
benefi ts not provided for by the state would also appear to be useful. 
These questions will be explored in the following  sub-chapter . 
2.3   CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE CONTEXT OF POWER 
CENTRE COMPETITION 
 Empirical case studies on civil society in weak states show that, in such 
contexts, civil society groups are often aligned with powerful social forces, 
such as state elites, semi-authoritarian political parties or insurgent groups 
(Götze  200 4 ; Lorch  2006 ,  2008 ; Shah  2008 ; South  2007 ; Verkoren and 
van Leeuwen  2014 ; see also Ottaway  2004 ). At the same time, state capac-
ity approaches to state weakness stress that weak states generally exist in an 
environment of social confl ict and lack autonomy from alternative power 
players, such as military factions, powerful political parties, local strong-
men or warlords (Migdal  1988 ; see also Biró  2007 ; Chesterman et  al. 
 2004 ; Migdal and Schlichte  2005 ). Against this backdrop, the current 
sub-chapter seeks to identify tentative theoretical linkages between the 
limited autonomy of the state, the existence of non-state power players 
and the limited autonomy of civil society in weak states. 
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 While strong states are autonomous bureaucratic entities that hold a 
monopoly on the use of force and are capable of enforcing authoritative deci-
sions and controlling the social sphere, the autonomy and the authority of 
weak states are contested by powerful social forces , that is  alternative power 
centres (Migdal  1988 ; see also Biró  2007 ; Eriksen  2005 ; von Trotha  2005 ). 
 Drawing on Migdal ( 1988 ), this study  uses the term alternative power centre 
to denote collectives of political and/or social elites both inside and outside 
the state apparatus, which are capable of circumventing the state’s formal 
rules and have the power to exercise  social control over signifi cant parts of 
the population. 3 Alternative power centres include collective elites as differ-
ent as military units, landed dynasties, political parties, insurgent groups and 
religious organizations (Biró  2007 ; Eriksen  2005 ; Migdal  1988 ; von Trotha 
 2005 ). Weak state bureaucracies compete with such alternative power cen-
tres for social control in an environment of social confl ict (Migdal  1988 ). 
 Weak states are fragmented polities and “oligopol ( ies ) ” of authority 
in which dependent segments of the population are controlled verti-
cally by state elites and alternative power centres (Migdal  1988 , esp. pp. 
208ff.; see also Ruud  1996 , esp. p. 191f.). As Chesterman et al. ( 2004 , 
p. 5) note, where a strong and neutral bureaucracy is lacking, even the 
existence of vibrant political parties, otherwise an important prerequisite 
for democracy, can enhance political fragmentation, as the former may 
capture the judiciary and other parts of the state and import inter-group 
confl ict into public institutions. Obviously, there are different degrees to 
which the autonomy of the state can be curtailed by alternative power 
centres, and weak states can be linked to alternative power centres in vari-
ous ways (Biró  2007 , pp. 41ff.; Migdal  1988 , esp. pp. 206–258; Migdal 
and Schlichte  2005 , p. 19). In some cases, certain bureaucratic entities of 
the state may be connected to alternative power centres through fl exible 
alliances and negotiated settlements (Migdal  1988 , esp. pp. 206–258; see 
also von Trotha  2005 , pp. 36f.). In others, by contrast, state elites may 
be able to establish a certain amount of supremacy over alternative power 
centres by co-opting or even incorporating them into the state apparatus 
(Migdal  1988 , pp. 229ff.). However, alternative power centres, such as 
elite families, military units , warlords or local strongmen, may also actively 
seek to capture the state, or parts of it, for the purpose of enhancing their 
own social and political infl uence (Biró  2007 , pp. 24ff.; Chesterman et al. 
 2004 , pp.  2ff.; Eriksen  2005 , pp.  397ff.; Migdal  1988 , pp.  238–258). 
The various types of alliances that can exist between state institutions and 
alternative power centres may differ considerably in terms of their fl ex-
ibility and durability. 
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 How do these patterns and dynamics infl uence civil society? As noted, 
conventional approaches generally defi ne civil society as an autonomous 
social sphere that is characterized by a high degree of self-organization. In 
contrast to this, the  relational approach supposes that the degree of auton-
omy of real, existing civil societies depends on their context of action  and, 
in particular, the state in which they operate ( for a related argument see 
Gosewinkel  2003 , pp. 9ff. ;  Gosewinkel and Rucht  2004 ; Gosewinkel et al. 
 200 4, pp. 14f.; 18–21 ). Similarly, empirical case studies show that in weak 
states civil society groups are often affi liated with powerful social forces, 
which can be considered as alternative power centres as defi ned in this 
study (Götze  200 4 ; Lorch  2006 ; Ottaway  2004 ; Shah  2008 ; South  2007 ). 
For instance, Götze ’s ( 200 4 ,  esp. p.  208 )  work on Bosnia-Herzegovina 
 suggests that where the state fails to guard both its own autonomy and 
the autonomy of the public sphere, civil society becomes vulnerable to co- 
optation by political elites. Most existing studies on co-opted civil society 
groups focus on co-optation by elites in authoritarian regimes (e.g. Heng 
 2004 ; Lorch  2006 ; Perinova  2005 ; Yang  2004 ). However, several authors 
also show that, in contexts of state weakness, civil society groups can like-
wise be aligned to powerful opposition groups, such as opposition parties 
or even   warlords or insurgent movements (Biró  2007 , p.  43; Ottaway 
 2004 , p. 130; Shah  2008 ; South  2007 ). 
 The work of Migdal suggests that alternative power centres will enter 
into alliances with civil society primarily for the purpose of enhancing their 
social control (Migdal  1988 , esp. pp. 24–3 3 ). Some empirically oriented 
studies confi rm and provide further insight into this pattern. Biró ( 2007 , 
esp. pp. 37 –43 ) shows, for instance, that both in Africa and Afghanistan, 
warlords seeking to stabilize their rule have often had to move beyond 
coercion and provide social services to local constituencies. However, as 
their primary character as entrepreneurs of violence has often prevented 
them from directly engaging in service delivery, many of these warlords 
have established linkages with civil society groups, such as “local solidarity 
networks” or foreign-funded NGOs. Moreover, several warlords have even 
transformed some of their armed factions into welfare-oriented groups. 
Similarly, armed ethnic groups in Burma have often sought to support 
the development of the regions they control by opening up spaces for 
civil society groups, such as NGOs (Lorch  2006 , pp. 24ff.; South  2007 ). 
This indicates that alternative power centres may deliberately seek to make 
use of the ability of civil society groups to provide social services in order 
to enhance their potential for social control. Further research is needed, 
however, in order to explore this assumption further. 
ANALYSING CIVIL SOCIETY IN WEAK STATES 43
 Moreover, Linz’s ( 2000 , pp.  175ff.) elaborations on mobilizational 
authoritarian regimes, Midgdal’s ( 1988 , pp. 232ff.) work on the Institu-
tional Revolutionary Party (PRI, Partido Revolucionario Institucional) of 
Mexico and Biró’s ( 2007 ) research on violent non-state actors suggest 
that socialist parties, liberation movements or “reform insurgencies” (Biró 
 2007 ) in particular may also establish or co-opt loyal civil society groups 
for the purpose of spreading their political beliefs and enhancing their ide-
ological control. Based on the case of Nepal, Shah ( 2008 , p. 46) further 
argues that in weak states, different types of political parties may use civil 
society as a “mobilization strategy” to build popular support for regime 
change. Additional, comparative insights are needed, however, to gain a 
more thorough understanding of why alternative power centres may link 
up with civil society groups and whether specifi c types of alternative power 
centres are more likely to engage with civil society than others. 
 Similarly, the questions of why civil society actors link up with alterna-
tive power centres and how such alliances impact on these actors’ ability 
to exert political infl uence have also remained largely unexplored so far. 
Studies on civil society in authoritarian contexts have argued that civil soci-
ety actors may deliberately allow themselves to become co-opted by politi-
cal elites in order to promote their own interests (e.g. Yang  2004 , pp. 13f.; 
Perinova  2005 , pp. 6ff., 28). Similarly, Shah ( 2008 , esp. pp. ix, 25ff., 46f.) 
shows that in the weak state of Nepal, civil society actors forged an alliance 
with the armed Maoist party to overthrow the monarchy. Moreover, those 
civil society groups that played an important role during the transition 
were also able to exercise considerable infl uence on the post-transition 
government. Similarly, in Pakistan, various secular NGOs welcomed the 
military coup of Pervez Musharraf, because they perceived it as a remedy 
against growing Islamization. After the coup, several NGO leaders acted 
as service contractors, advisers or even cabinet members of the military 
government, which provided them with substantial political infl uence 
(Zaidi  2006 ). Comparative fi ndings are needed, however, to investigate 
these issues in depth. 
 How do alliances between civil society groups and alternative power 
centres impact the structure of civil society? Existing studies on civil soci-
ety in weak states suggest that national civil societies that are character-
ized by power centre alignments will  mirror the structure of the power 
centre competition which prevails in the respective weak state (Götze 
 200 4 ; Rombouts  2006 , p. 34ff.; Weijer and Kilnes  2012 , pp. vf., 5ff.). 
Specifi cally, Götze shows that in post-confl ict Bosnia-Herzegovina, the 
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national Red Cross remained divided into two sub-organizations,   the 
Red Cross of the Bosnian-Croatian Federation and the Red Cross of 
the Serbian Republic, both of which were  aligned with powerful nationalist 
part ies and groups , thereby refl ecting the main fault line s of the Bosnian-
Herzegovinian state  (Götze 2004, esp. pp. 207–11) . Similarly, civil society 
in the weak state of Pakistan has long refl ected the competition between 
Islamist  forces on the one hand and the military and other secular forces 
on the other (Zaidi  2006 ). Additional empirical fi ndings and theoretical 
refl ections are necessary, however, to explore these observations further. 
 Moreover, the existing literature suggests that power centre alignments 
may also infl uence the internal structures of individual civil society groups. 
Specifi cally, studies on civil society in China and Vietnam show that com-
munist or socialist parties frequently set up  sectoral mass organizations , such 
as worker, peasant or women groups, which operate within the sphere of civil 
society and may enhance their organizational autonomy over time (Perinova 
 2005 , esp. p. 14 ; Wischermann et al.  2015 ). Sectoral organizations in this sense 
comprise, and are confi ned to , members of the same occupational status, gen-
der or age (e.g. Hawes  1990 ). Both Migdal’s work on (post-)revolutionary 
Mexico ( 1988 , pp. 232ff.) and Linz’s ( 2000 , pp. 175ff.) research on mobi-
lizational authoritarian regimes suggest that the pattern of sectoral organiza-
tion can sometimes be found in civil society groups aligned with liberation 
parties and other types of revolutionary parties as well. Additional research is 
needed, however, to confi rm and further investigate this assumption. 
 In addition, fi ndings from Vietnam suggest that civil society organiza-
tions that are controlled by socialist or communist parties that rely on 
the Marxist-Leninist principle of  democratic centralism will usually be 
highly hierarchical in nature and also practise democratic centralism them-
selves (Wischermann et al.  2015 ). This is because democratic centralism 
constitutes a direct link between socialist or communist parties and their 
affi liated mass organizations. Moreover, as an organizational mechanism, 
democratic centralism codifi es the three core principles of subordinat-
ing the minority to the majority, the individual to the collective and the 
lower organizational units to the higher ones (Angle  2005 ; Wischermann 
et  al.  2015 ).  Similarly ,   drawing on Chakrabarty, Ruud ( 1996 , p.  192) 
 notes that in  the segmented  polity of India ,  where individuals and social 
groups  often tend to be attached vertically to political and social elites, 
 the internal structure  of trade unions is also often hierarchical and leader- 
centred, an observation that may apply to  other civil society organizations 
as well. Comparative research must further investigate, however, to what 
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extent civil society groups aligned to power centres other than socialist or 
communist parties are also internally hierarchical, and why this might be 
the case. 
 Zaidi’s ( 2006 , p. 3557) work on Pakistan suggests that close linkages 
between civil society groups and alternative power centres lead to a “close 
accommodation between civil and uncivil society” or, in order words, to 
the emergence of dark sides in civil society. More specifi cally, Weijer and 
Kilnes ( 2012 , p. 5) note that in weak states “confl ict tends to strengthen 
bonding social capital within identity groups, to the detriment of social 
capital across groups”. Drawing on this, it might be concluded that civil 
society groups that are aligned with different types of alternative power 
centres in the weak state are likely to generate particularistic or bond-
ing forms of social capital that run along, rather than cut across existing 
social cleavages. However, this issue has not been investigated in depth 
as of yet. Similarly, the question of how power centre alignments impact 
the ability of civil society groups to perform other  democratic functions , 
such as watchdog and representative functions, or the function of being 
democratic intermediaries, has also remained largely unexplored to date. 
 The literature on weak states suggests that the strategies that state elites 
and alternative power centres employ to enhance their social  and political 
control can often be reduced to patronage, violence or a combination of 
both (Eriksen  2005 ; Migdal  1988 ; 4 Myrdal  1968 ; Schneckener  2006 , p. 31). 
These strategies are bound to have an impact on national civil societies. 
2.4   CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE CONTEXT OF PATRONAGE 
AND CORRUPTION 
 Both the empirically oriented literature on civil society and German transi-
tion theory show that in developing countries and countries undergoing 
political transformations, civil society groups are often tainted by patron-
age and corruption (e.g.  Croissant  2000 ; Croissant et al.  2000 ; Holloway 
 1997 ; Lauth  2003 ). Similarly, the literature on weak states has found that 
patronage and corruption are particularly salient in weak states, which 
lack the capacity to implement administrative decisions and establish full- 
fl edged social control over the entire population (e.g. Clapham  1982 , 
p.  25; Eriksen  2005 ; Myrdal  1968 ; Migdal  1988 ; Schneckener  2006 , 
p. 30). Against this backdrop, the  present sub-chapter focuses on identify-
ing the possible interfaces between civil society, patronage and corruption 
in the context of a weak state. 
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 Patronage and  clientelism can be defi ned minimally as “a relationship 
of exchange between unequals” (Clapham  1982 , p.  4), 5 whereby the 
aspect of inequality can refer to either the socio-economic status or the 
political power of the parties involved. While the benefi ts traded can be 
both material and non-material in nature, clientelistic exchanges generally 
follow particularistic rather than universalistic criteria. Patron-client ties 
thus constitute interclass linkages, tying members of the lower social strata 
vertically to social and political elites. Nevertheless, clientelistic relations 
are, to a certain extent, mutually benefi cial in character and entered into 
voluntarily (e.g. Roniger  1994a , p. 24; Günes-Ayata  1994 ; Landé  1977 ; 
Lemarchand  1981 , p. 15; Piattoni  2001a ,  b ; Scott and Kerkvliet  1977 , 
pp. 439f.) 
 From the point of view of social and political elites, patronage is pre-
dominantly a  strategy of social control (Migdal  1988 ; see also Clapham 
 1982 , pp. 19f.; Günes-Ayata  1994 , p. 21; Piattoni  2001a , p. 2; Roniger 
 2004 ), a pattern that often holds for corruption as well (Lorch  2014 ). The 
literature on weak states shows that where the state lacks the administra-
tive capacity for authoritative decision-making, state leaders and bureau-
cratic elites frequently resort to patronage or corruption for the purpose 
of exercising a minimum of social and political control (e.g. Eriksen  2005 , 
p. 400; Migdal  1988 ; Myrdal  1968 ; Schneckener  2006 , p. 30). Patronage 
and corruption, in this sense, can take various forms, including political 
jobbery, that is, the appointment of state offi cials on the basis of loyalty 
rather than qualifi cation, the biased allocation of development projects 
or the selective implementation of laws (Clapham  1982 , pp. 25f.; Migdal 
 1988 , pp. 217ff.; Smith  2004 ; WB  2016 ; Roniger  2004 , pp. 357, 368). 
These observations are fully consistent with the older literature on patron-
age, which has pointed out that in contexts of administrative ineffective-
ness, patron-client relations can be highly functional, because they can 
act as “addenda” “to institutions whose defi ciencies they remedy” (Landé 
 1977 , p. xxi). Thereby, patronage can serve functions as diverse as physi-
cal protection, the delivery of social services and representation (ibid; see 
also Clapham  1982 ; Lemarchand  1981 , pp. 13ff.; Piattoni  2001a ; Scott 
and Kerkvliet  1977 ). With regard to the latter function, Clapham (22ff.) 
has stressed, for instance, that in post-colonial states the introduction of 
the universal suffrage has often resulted in a blending of the security and 
welfare functions of clientelism with representative politics, leading to the 
emergence of a particular type of clientelism that he calls “clientelism of 
representation”. Similarly, Landé has noted that, with regard to electoral 
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politics, patronage sometimes “protects an ordinary member or citizen 
against the risk of being left out during the distribution of particularistic 
benefi ts, while giving elected offi cials some voters who can be counted 
upon” (Landé  1977 :  xxi– xxii). However, the use of patronage as a strategy 
of social control is not limited to state elites and political parties. Instead, 
very different types of alternative power centres, including large landown-
ers, local strongmen , warlords or insurgent groups, can employ patronage 
in order to strengthen their social control over dependent populations 
and increase their political infl uence in weak states (Migdal  1988 ; see also 
Biró  2007 ). 
 Given that they prevent the emergence of class-based linkages and tie 
local constituencies vertically to social and political elites, patron-client 
relations usually form part of fragmented political orders (Landé  1977 , 
p. xxixf.; Scott and Kerkvliet  1977 , pp. 439f.). Moreover, as it centres on 
the distribution of particularistic benefi ts, patronage can reinforce social 
divisions and, thus, have a disruptive effect on social groups and com-
munities. Patronage can thus further aggravate existing confl icts and rein-
force dynamics of violence within oligarchic orders (e.g. Clapham  1982 , 
pp. 11f.; Landé  1977 , p. xxxiif.; Piattoni  2001b , p. 199). 
 In most states where patronage is widespread, a relatively small number 
of patrons are confronted with a comparatively large number of (poten-
tial) clients. Consequently, such states are usually characterized by the 
existence of multiple clientelistic chains that link dependent constituen-
cies, alternative power centres and state elites to each other. Within such 
clientelistic chains, alternative power centres and individual elites can act 
as  middlemen , also referred to as clientelistic  intermediaries , mediators 
or (electoral) brokers in the literature.  Middlemen , in this sense, control 
access to the higher echelons of social and political power and, oftentimes, 
to avenues of resource conversion (Clapham  1982 , pp. 8f., 13; Günes- 
Ayata  1994 , pp. 22f.; Migdal  1988 ; Migdal and Schlichte  2005 , p. 13; 
Myrdal  1968 , pp. 814f.; Roniger  1994a ,  b ). 
 How do these patterns and dynamics impact civil society? Scholarship 
on civil society based on normative democratic theory and international 
donor discourses usually consider patronage and civil society to be oppo-
sites. Similarly, they normally view civil society organizations as strong 
guardians against corruption (Holloway  1997 ; Roniger  199 4a , pp.  8 f.; 
for   a prominent example see Mungiu-Pippidi  2013 ). Several studies on 
patronage and various critical studies on civil society, by contrast, have 
pointed to the complex interrelations between civil society and patronage 
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in many contemporary settings (e.g. Alexander  1998 , pp. 12ff.; Günes- 
Ayata  1994 ; Roniger  1994a ,  b ; Piattoni  2001a ,  b ). 
 In fact, the concepts of civil society and patronage share various 
important characteristics. Specifi cally, just like civil society organizations, 
patron-client networks generally exist between the public and the private 
realms. Moreover, both social interactions that take place in civil soci-
ety and clientelistic exchanges are characterized by  voluntarism , because, 
unlike primordial ties, patron-client relations are non-ascriptive in nature. 
Furthermore, despite their unequal character, clientelistic relationships 
are, to a certain extent, mutually benefi cial in nature and may thus display 
various features that are supposedly found in civil society as well, such 
as reciprocity, solidarity or trust (Eisenstadt and Roniger  1984 , pp. 9ff.; 
Günes-Ayata  1994 , pp. 23ff.; Lemarchand  1981 , p. 15; Piattoni  2001a , 
pp. 12f.; Powell  1977 , p. 148; Roniger  1994a , pp. 4–13; Roniger, 1998 , 
p. 72, Scott and Kerkvliet  1977 ). 
 The literature on the demand side of clientelism suggests that in con-
texts where state elites and alternative power centres distribute patronage 
for the purpose of enhancing their social control,  civil society groups might 
react by using clientelism as a deliberate strategy to realize their own goals as 
well (e.g. Günes-Ayata  1994 ; Piattoni  2001a ,  b ; Roniger  2004 ). Roniger 
( 2004 , p. 363) has argued, for instance, that researchers should treat cli-
entelism as “one of various strategies stemming from civil society”   and 
that it  may sometimes constitute a “means to advance rights and popular 
demands” (ibid: 359). Similarly, Piattoni ( 2001b , p. 2) has noted that
 clientelism and patronage are strategies for the acquisition, maintenance, 
and aggrandizement of political power, on the part of the patrons, and strat-
egies for the protection and promotion of their interests, on the part of 
the clients, and … their deployment is driven by given sets of incentives 
and disincentives. As such, their relative diffusion is connected with … the 
emergence, transformation, and demise of constellations of institutional and 
historical circumstances which make these strategies politically more or less 
viable and socially more or less acceptable. 
 The same tendencies appear to apply to the  strategic use of corruption by 
civil society actors as well (Lorch  2014 ). Patron-client relations and corrup-
tion connect civil society groups to state elites and alternative power cen-
tres, and it can be assumed that the stability of these linkages depends on 
the degree to which the respective civil society actors’ expectations are met 
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(for a similar argument see Günes-Ayata  1994 , p. 23; Scott and Kerkvliet 
 1977 , p. 448). The existing literature further suggests that civil society 
actors may enter into clientelistic alliances with state elites and alterna-
tive power centres in order to gain preferential access to resources and 
promote the material interests of their constituencies (e.g. Günes-Ayata 
 1994 , pp.  25ff.; Piattoni  2001a , p.  7; Roniger  1994a , p.  10; Roniger 
 2004 , pp. 357ff.). Comparative empirical research is needed, however, to 
further explore these patterns in depth. 
 The literature on patronage also suggests that in weak states, civil 
society actors may act as  middlemen in clientelistic chains involving state 
agencies and alternative power centres (Landé  1977 ; Piattoni  2001a , b ; 
Powell  1977 ). As Piattoni ( 2001b , p. 203) argues, for instance, in post- 
traditional societies the position of the patron is accessible to anybody 
who has the necessary “capacity as mediator”. Similarly, Landé ( 1977 , 
p. xxxv i .) has noted that in contexts of administrative ineffectiveness, the 
role of the middleman can be assumed by a large variety of actors, includ-
ing semi-educated peasant leaders and representatives of the middle class. 
By the same token, it has argued that many post-feudal societies have seen 
the emergence of “new brokers”, such as “small intellectuals” (Powell 
1977), 6 whose mediating skills and “intermediate” socio-economic status 
enable them to perform this function (Powell  1977 , pp. 149f.). As noted, 
third sector research and scholarship on civil society sometimes points to 
the  intermediary function  of civil society actors   as well. However, they 
usually defi ne this function in the democratic sense of the term, that is 
they often view civil society as an interlocutor, conveying the interests 
of marginalized social groups to the state (e.g. Croissant et  al.  2000 ; 
Edwards and Hulme  1996a ,  b ; Kramer  2000 , p. 16; Lewis  2004 ). The 
possible overlaps and tensions between the democratic and the clientelist 
intermediary function of civil society in weak states have, by contrast, been 
insuffi ciently investigated to date. 
 Existing research on civil society and patronage further suggests that 
civil society groups embedded in patron-client networks are bound 
to reproduce the latter’s organizational features (e.g. Clapham  1982 , 
pp. 29f.; Roniger  1994b , p. 210). Most notably, civil society groups that 
engage in clientelistic exchanges are likely to replicate the “hierarchical 
logic of patronage” (Roniger  1998 , p. 71), leading to the emergence or 
consolidation of strong intra-organizational hierarchies (ibid.; see also 
Alexander  1998 , pp.  13ff.; Günes-Ayata  1994 , pp.  19ff.). Moreover, 
given that patronage is based on the distribution of particularistic 
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benefi ts, it may lead to the emergence of standards for inclusion and 
exclusion, which run counter to universalism and fairness (Günes-Ayata 
 1994 , pp. 24ff.;  Piattoni  2001a , p. 18) , compromising the democratic 
potential of civil society groups . Concurrently, Roniger ( 2004 , p. 354) 
has noted that  clientelism can constitute a form of “partial political 
mobilization”. Consequently, it can be assumed that patron-client rela-
tions not only promote the emergence of fragmented political orders 
(e.g. Landé  1977 , pp. xxixf.) but can also cause severe divisions within 
civil society. However, this assumption has not yet been discussed exten-
sively in the literature on civil society. 
 Given that corruption has been found to exist inside the sphere of civil 
society as well (e.g. Holloway  1997 ; Trivunovic  2011 ), similar organiza-
tional problems can be expected when civil society groups in weak states 
engage in outright corruption. However, further comparative empirical 
evidence is needed to explore this assumption. 
2.5   CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE CONTEXT OF VIOLENCE 
AND INSECURITY 
 Several recent studies on civil society in weak states as well as some histori-
cal studies on civil society in the USA and Europe show that in contexts 
where the state’s monopoly on force is not fully established, civil society 
groups are often tainted by violence (e.g. Englehardt  2011 ; Henry  2011 ; 
Knöbl  2006 ; Leonhard  2004 ; Mitra  2003 ; Reichardt  200 4 ; Shah  2008 ). 
At the same time, the literature on weak states holds that state weak-
ness is often associated with high levels of violence (e.g. Doornbos  2003 ; 
Milliken and Krause  2003 ; Schneckener  2006 ; Rotberg  2002 ,  2004 ). But 
how exactly does state weakness contribute to the emergence of violent 
practices within the sphere of civil society? 
 Where the bureaucratic institutions of the state are weak, the use of 
violence often constitutes a  political strategy that can be employed by both 
state elites and alternative power centres for the purpose of exercising 
social control and enhancing their infl uence in the weak state (Biró  2007 ; 
Mair  2002 ; Migdal  1988 ; pp. 223ff.; Milliken and Krause  2003 , pp. 4f.; 
Schneckener  2006 , pp.  12f., 22, 31; Schneckener  2009 ). As Migdal 
( 1988 , pp. 223–28) argues, in weak states that lack capacity, state elites 
often resort to “dirty tricks”, such as enforced disappearances, imprison-
ment or torture, in order to contain political opponents and sa feguard 
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their political survival. This strategy encompasses violent repressions 
against actors in civil society, such as student activists, trade union mem-
bers or peasant leaders (for a similar argument see Rotberg  2004 , pp. 16f.; 
Schneckener  2006 , p. 31). 
 Moreover, the inability of the state to exercise a monopoly on force can 
lead to the emergence of alternative power centres that are capable of using 
violence as a political strategy as well. This includes violent non- state actors 
as diverse as armed big landowners and local strongmen, Communist 
insurgencies and liberation movements, terrorist groups or criminal gangs. 
The forms of violence employed by these different types of power centres 
differ greatly, owing to differences in their political motivations, strategies 
and organizational strength. Communist and liberation insurgencies, for 
instance, often employ violence for the purpose of capturing state power or 
achieving territorial control (Biró  2007 ; Doornbos  2003 , pp. 47ff.; Mair 
 2002 , pp. 9–20; Schneckener  2009 ). More specifi cally, Maoist insurgen-
cies and other ideological insurgent movements in particular often build 
up their military capacity through step-by-step organizing and by gradu-
ally trying to win the hearts and minds of the local population (Biró  2007 , 
pp. 30f.). Concurrently, they frequently target military installations or state 
institutions and seek to avoid civilian casualties (Mair  2002 , pp.  9–20). 
Terrorist groups, by contrast, are often uninterested in territorial control 
and use violence indiscriminately, seeking to cause high numbers of civil-
ian casualties. Still other violent power centres, such as  warlords or local 
strongmen, may use violence as a means to realize their economic interests 
or carve out spaces of local autonomy for themselves ( Biró  2007 ;   Doornbos 
 2003 , pp. 47ff.; Mair  2002 , pp. 9–20; Schneckener  2009 ). 
 Weak states are often spaces of tremendous insecurity, either because 
the security agencies of the state fail to protect the population from 
onslaughts by violent non-state actors or because state elites and mem-
bers of the state security apparatus engage in violent repression and, thus, 
constitute sources of insecurity themselves (e.g. Doornbos  2003 ; Milliken 
and Krause  2003 , pp. 4f.; Schneckener  2006 , p. 22; Rotberg  2004 , p. 16). 
Furthermore, in contexts of violent confl ict, rudimentary forms of security 
may, at times, not be provided by the state, but rather by non-state power 
centres with a capacity for violence, such as insurgent groups or armed 
local strongmen. More precisely, such non-state power centres may pro-
tect local communities from state repression or violent onslaughts by rival 
armed groups, thereby gaining local support (e.g. Andersen  2006 ; Migdal 
 1988 ; Ottaway  2004 ; Rotberg  2004 , pp. 5ff.). 
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 What does all this mean for civil society? According to normative defi ni-
tions, civil society is characterized by a high degree of “civility” that fi nds its 
expression in the use of dialogue  and other means of peaceful dispute reso-
lution and is, thus, diametrically opposed to violence (Gosewinkel  2003 , 
p. 18; Henry  2011 , pp. 97ff.; Leonhard  2004 , p. 27; Knöbl  2006 , p. 1; 
Reichardt  200 4 , p. 64; Stacey and Meyer  2005 ). This dichotomy between 
civil society and violence, which is dominant in the literature on civil soci-
ety, is also reinforced by existing research on political violence (Henry 
 2011 , p. 97). But how can we explain the occurrence of violence within 
national civil societies in weak states, which several studies have observed? 
 As already mentioned earlier, some authors argue that violent practices 
characterize national civil societies particularly in those contexts where 
the state’s monopoly on the use of force is weak (e.g. Englehardt  2011 ; 
Knöbl  2006 ; Reichardt  200 4 ). More specifi cally, these studies have noted 
that where the centralization of violence in the hands of the state remains 
incomplete, it is often relatively easy for civil society and other social actors 
to access guns and other means of violence: a condition that increases the 
likelihood of social and political confl icts being settled through physical 
force. Moreover, the state’s monopoly on force is generally seen to have 
a disciplinary impact on society, which, along with the provision of legal 
channels for expression, leads to social affect control and the development 
of social norms, which delegitimize the use of inter-personal violence 
(Knöbl  2006 ,  esp. pp.  8 ff.; Reichardt  200 4 , pp. 64–74). However, these 
studies do not clearly distinguish between civil society and society as a 
whole. In addition, their fi ndings have so far remained largely unrelated to 
the different forms of violence that have been found to exist in weak states. 
 Stacey and Meyer ( 2005 , p. 184) claim that civil society is capable of 
“deliberate violence”, or, in other words, that civil society actors may 
employ violence as a  deliberate strategy to realize their goals. To date, 
however, this argument has been insuffi ciently tested through comparative 
empirical research. Similarly, the questions of how the strategic use of vio-
lence by civil society actors may be related to the violent strategies that are 
employed by state elites and alternative power centres in weak states and 
what specifi c motives may drive civil society actors to resort to violence 
have, likewise, remained largely unexplored. 
 The few existing studies that focus explicitly on the relationship between 
civil society and violence suggest that civil society actors may employ vio-
lence both as a means self-defence (Henry  2011 , pp. 102ff.; Reichardt 
 200 4 , p. 64) and as part of a broader strategy to realize certain higher 
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political goals, such as democracy or the enlargement of civil society space 
(Reichardt  200 4 , pp. 64ff.). More specifi cally, it has been argued that civil 
society actors may resort to violence when they operate under an authori-
tarian regime in which peaceful forms of resistance have been proven inef-
fective (Henry  2011 ; Stacey and Meyer  2005 , pp. 186ff.). This assumption 
is in line with Schneckener’s ( 2006 , pp. 28ff.) more general fi nding that, 
in contexts of state weakness, repression by state security forces can trigger 
social unrest and violent opposition. Moreover, it is also supported by the 
fi ndings of Humphreys and Weinstein ( 2006 , p. 9), who argue that people 
sometimes join armed rebellions in order to counter state repression in 
contexts where “non-violent channels” of political expression are blocked. 
However, whether civil society actors, driven by these or similar motives, 
are capable of using violence autonomously remains open to debate. 
 As indicated earlier, civil society groups in weak states are often affi li-
ated with alternative power centres, and existing research shows that 
this also includes violent non-state actors, such as warlords, local strong-
men or insurgent groups. Moreover, the existing literature also implies 
that civil society actors may enter into alliances with such violent power 
centres for purposes of protection as well as in order to gain access to 
economic resources or realize their goals (e.g. Biró  2007 ; Humphreys 
and Weinstein  2006 ; Migdal  1988 ; Ottaway  2004 ; Shah  2008 ; Verkoren 
and van Leeuwen  2014 ).  More specifi cally, the case of the Burmese pro- 
democracy movement suggest s that alliances with non-state armed groups 
can have a profound impact on civil society organizations. Specifi cally, 
they may come to support armed struggle or even transform themselves 
into armed groups over time  (for a similar argument see Henry  2011 ) . 
Further research is needed, however, to clarify the relationship between 
the existence of alliances between civil society groups and violent power 
centres on the one hand and the emergence of violent practices in civil 
society on the other. 
 Some historical and sociological studies argue that, under certain con-
ditions, violence can, in fact, constitute an  enabling condition for civil 
society to emerge (e.g. Gosewinkel  2003 , p. 19; Leonhard  2004 ; Mitra 
 2003 ; Reichardt  200 4 , pp. 69f.). Drawing on the example of India, Mitra 
( 2003 , p. 1) notes that collective violence can sometimes constitute “a 
form of violent participation, which, in the fi nal analysis, acts as the mid-
wife of civil society”. Similarly, other authors show that in the history of 
Europe, wars and violent confl icts have often played an important role 
in facilitating the emergence of a civil society space (e.g. Gosewinkel 
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 2003 , p.  18f. ; Leonhard  2004 ). Leonard ( 2004 , pp.  29f.) shows, for 
instance, that both in Western Europe and in the USA the development 
of many voluntary associations was directly linked to nationalist mobi-
lization in the context of warfare. These observations also suggest that 
some forms of violence tend to be more conducive to the emergence of 
civil society than others. However, existing studies have not yet related 
the emergence of civil society to the different forms of violence found 
in weak states. 
 A fi nal important question relates to how an environment of vio-
lence and insecurity shapes the internal workings of civil society groups. 
Research, which touches upon this issue,   tentatively suggests that the 
internal organizational structures of civil society groups that operate in 
contexts of insecurity tend to be rather hierarchical and centred on indi-
vidual leaders (e.g. Krok-Paszkowska  2003 , p. 120) 7 . To substantiate this 
 assumption and gain a better understanding of how exactly insecurity may 
lead to the emergence of intra-organizational hierarchies within civil soci-
ety groups, further comparative research is needed. 
2.6   THE INTERVENING VARIABLE: THE IMPACT 
OF FOREIGN AID 
 Research on civil society promotion by international donors is largely 
unanimous in stressing the enormous impact that foreign funding and 
other forms of donor support can have on civil society groups and their 
relationship to the state (e.g. Edwards and Hulme  1996a ,  b ; Carothers and 
de Gramont  2013 , esp. p. 176; Ottaway and Carothers  2000 ; Seckinelgin 
 2002 ). By the same token, the literature on weak states points to the 
important role of colonial state-building, external dependence and foreign 
funding in shaping the political structures and policy decisions of weak 
states (e.g. Chesterman et al.  2004 ; Clapham  2003 ; Eriksen  2005 ; Migdal 
 1988 ; Schneckener  2007 ). Against this backdrop, the present sub-chapter 
conceptualizes international donor infl uences as an important intervening 
variable that can have a tremendous impact on state-civil society relations 
in contexts of state weakness. 
 As discussed extensively elsewhere, colonial rulers around the world 
generally sought to extract from their colonies as many resources as pos-
sible at the lowest possible cost. Consequently, post-colonial state lead-
ers frequently inherited state apparatuses with strong repressive, but very 
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weak administrative, capacities (e.g. Leftwich  2004 , pp. 145ff.). In addi-
tion, colonial powers generally relied on the co-optation of powerful social 
forces for the purpose of governing peripheral areas. As a result of this, 
formerly independent local patrons, such as feudal landowners or rural 
strongmen, were incorporated into the colonial state apparatus or turned 
into middlemen, connecting dependent segments of the population to 
the state. In many weak states, the prevalence of patronage is thus rooted 
in colonial state formation (Clapham  1982 , p. 10; Kivimäki and Laakso 
 2000 , p. 20; Migdal  1988 ,  e.g. pp.  262ff.). 
 The availability of external sources of funding, such as revenues from 
the export of natural resources or international aid, can also be conducive 
to weak state formation, because it may release political elites from the 
need of building strong state institutions for the purpose of taxation or 
the promotion of economic growth. Moreover, foreign aid in particu-
lar is often subject to political conditionalities, which curtail the recipi-
ent state’s autonomy with regard to policy decision-making (e.g. Eriksen 
 2005 , pp. 398ff.; Smith  2004 , pp. 151, 165ff.). In the  1970s and 1980s, 
donor conditionalities usually included administrative downsizing, mar-
ket liberalization and privatization. Since the   late 19 8 0s, many donors 
beg a n to promote the contracting-out of social services to NGOs and 
other civil society actors, thereby departing from their earlier approach 
of leaving the generation of welfare services entirely to the market (Banks 
et al.  2015 ; Edwards and Hulme  1996a , p. 2 ff. ; Seckinelgin  2002 , Smith 
2004, pp. 166f. ). Finally, starting from the mid-2000s, many international 
donor agencies adopted “bottom-up” or “demand-side” approaches to 
democracy promotion, which included civil society support as an impor-
tant component (Carothers and de Gramont  2013 , pp. 136ff.). 
 Against this backdrop,  this sub-chapter focuses on the impact that 
foreign aid can have on the ability of civil society to perform functions 
normally ascribed to the state ( see Sub-chap.  2.2 ), on the relationship 
between civil society actors and alternative power centres ( see Sub-chap. 
 2.3 ) as well as on the way in which civil society is affected by the environ-
ment of patronage and corruption ( see Sub-chap.  2.4 ) and of violence and 
insecurity ( see Sub-chap .  2.5 ) that often prevails in weak states. 
 The existing literature shows that in many developing countries inter-
national donor support has strengthened the ability of local civil society 
groups to deliver social services not provided for by the state. Since the 
19 8 0s, international aid agencies have channelled increasing amounts of 
money through service-oriented NGOs. At the same time, they have often 
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pressured weak state bureaucracies to outsource welfare tasks to civil society 
and to establish institutional agreements for contracting-out social services 
to NGOs, thereby promoting the emergence of mixed-welfare systems 
(e.g. Banks et al.  2015 ; Edwards and Hulme  1996a , pp. 1f f .; INTRAC 
 2013 ; Smith  2004 , pp. 166f.). Given that it usually offers rather attractive 
salaries and working conditions, the foreign-funded NGO sector has often 
lured educated professionals away from the civil service, leading to a brain 
drain that has weakened the administrative capacity of weak states even 
further (e.g. Abuzeid  2009 ). Moreover, in many weak states the growth 
of the local NGO sector has been donor-driven and has lacked sustain-
ability, with many local NGOs disappearing when foreign funding dries up 
(Ottaway and Carothers  2000 , pp. 299f.). However, the questions of how 
different kinds of national welfare systems shape the sizes and the struc-
tures of local NGO sectors and what role different international donor 
paradigms play in this regard have thus far remained largely unexplored. 
 Many international donors assume that by generating social capital, 
representing the interest s of marginalized constituencies, acting as inter-
mediaries linking disenfranchised communities to the state and by per-
forming a watchdog function vis-à-vis the state, civil society groups in 
general, and donor funded NGOs in particular, can also contribute to 
democratic institution- building ( Edwards and Hulme 1996a, b ; Ottaway 
 2004 , pp. 128f.; Carothers and Ottaway  2000 ; Ottaway and Carothers 
 2000 ; Seckinelgin  2002 ). In contrast, some more critical studies on NGOs 
have argued that there is often a trade-off between the latter’s involve-
ment in social service delivery and their ability to act as political advo-
cates. Specifi cally, in order to receive foreign funding, local NGOs may 
expand their apolitical welfare activities at the expense of their advocacy 
programmes (e.g. Banks and Hulme  2012 ; Edwards and Hulme  1996a , 
pp.  5ff.). Moreover, the engagement of NGOs in large-scale and stan-
dardized service delivery is highly conducive to the professionalization 
and bureaucratization of these formerly more voluntary associations, a 
trend that is reinforced by the reporting and accounting requirements 
of international donors (Edwards and Hulme  1996a , p. 8; Ottaway and 
Carothers  2000 ; Uphoff  1996 , pp. 23ff.). Accordingly, many local devel-
opment NGOs in weak states are not member associations, but run by 
salaried staff, leading several authors to question their potential to gener-
ate social capital and serve a representative function for their constituen-
cies (e.g. Carothers and Ottaway  2000 ; Ottaway  2004 , p. 128; Ottaway 
and Carothers  2000 ). 
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 Furthermore, several critical works have argued that foreign aid may 
depoliticize local development NGOs and national civil societies in devel-
oping countries more generally (e.g. Banks et al.  2015 , p. 709; Harriss 
 2002 ; Rahman  2006 ; Zaidi  2006 , p. 3557). More specifi cally, it has been 
shown that donor funding often promotes the professionalization and 
bureaucratization of NGOs and that the latter often form part of inter-
national donor programmes, which conceptualize development as a tech-
nical and apolitical endeavour (e.g. Banks et  al.  2015 , p. 709). Harriss 
( 2002 ) has argued that NGOs are thus part and parcel of what Ferguson 
has termed, the “anti-politics machine” of international aid. In addition, 
many international donors equate civil society with NGOs and, there-
fore, allocate huge amounts of resources to support the growth of the 
NGO sector, while marginalizing other, more politically active civil society 
actors, such as social movements (e.g. Edwards  2004 , pp. 14, 24; Ottaway 
and Carothers  2000 , pp. 295f.; Seckinelgin  2002 ). However, the question 
of how exactly foreign funding depoliticizes civil society in weak states and 
what role different donor paradigms, the structure of the local NGO sec-
tor and the infl uence of alternative power centres play in this regard have 
not, as yet, been fully explored. 
 The literatures on civil society, state weakness and foreign aid all sug-
gest that international donor support can act as an intervening variable 
that can have a strong impact on the relationship between civil society, 
the state and alternative power centres (e.g. Carothers and de Gramont 
 2013 ; Carothers and Ottaway  2000 ; Ottaway and Carothers  2000 ; Shah 
 2008 ; Seckinelgin  2002 ; Zaidi  2006 ). For example, international donors 
often make their fi nancial support to weak states conditional on consulta-
tion with civil society, thereby strengthening the latter’s position vis-à- 
vis the state (e.g. Seckinelgin  2002 , pp. 18ff.). Moreover, by providing 
them with an independent resource base, foreign aid can also enhance 
the autonomy of civil society groups from the state and alternative power 
centres. However, this increase in local autonomy often comes at the cost 
of increased dependence on foreign donors, making civil society groups 
susceptible to foreign agenda-setting (Shah  2008 , p. 43). 
 At the same time, foreign aid may also be appropriated by alternative 
power centres that oppose the state, including both non-violent opposition 
parties and violent non-state actors, such as warlords or insurgent groups. 
As noted earlier, such alternative power centres may try to exert social 
control over local constituencies by delivering welfare services through 
co-opted civil society groups or may even establish loyal civil society 
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groups in order to access donor funding (Biró  2007 , pp. 42f.; Ottaway 
 2004 ; Schneckener  2009 , p. 11). During the Cold War, many “Western” 
aid agencies promoted explicitly apolitical NGOs in order to marginal-
ize Communist parties and other leftist movements (e.g. Carothers and 
Ottaway  2000 , pp. 6ff.; Ottaway and Carothers  2000 , p. 299), which, in 
turn, were often supported by the Soviet Union (Mair  2002 , pp. 13ff.). 
However, additional research is needed to determine when international 
donor support enhances the autonomy of civil society, breaking the ties 
between civil society groups and alternative power centres; and when such 
support instead serves to strengthen existing linkages between civil society 
groups and alternative power centres or state elites. 
 Regarding the impact that international donor support can have on 
the relationship between civil society, patronage and corruption, critical 
scholarship has argued that foreign funding can spur corruption in the 
NGO sector (e.g. Holloway  1997 , Ottaway 2004, p. 132 ). Weak states 
usually lack the capacity to monitor foreign-funded NGOs (e.g. Edwards 
and Hulme  1996a , p. 8f.): a condition that can enable the emergence of 
clientelistic practices within these groups. Moreover, in weak states the 
contracting-out of welfare services, which is often promoted by foreign 
donors, frequently leads to the emergence of complex patterns of patron-
age and corruption ( e.g.  Smith  2004 , p. 166). This tendency is bound 
to affect civil society groups acting as social service contractors as well. 
Nevertheless, the question of how donor interventions infl uence the way 
in which local civil society actors relate to the manifold patronage and cor-
ruption networks that exist in weak states has remained largely unexplored. 
 Existing research shows that patronage and corruption are facilitated 
by a lack of accountability and that clientelistic exchanges usually follow a 
hierarchical logic. Critical scholarship on foreign-funded NGOs fi nds that 
the internal organizational structures of these civil society groups are often 
hierarchical and lack transparency (e.g. Ottaway and Carothers  2000 , 
pp. 305f.; Uphoff  1996 ). More specifi cally, Tandon ( 1996 , p. 56) claims 
that many NGOs in developing countries are characterized by informality 
and exclusiveness and are dominated by “founder-leaders”. A quantitative 
study of 492 NGOs in six Asian countries fi nds that internal hierarchies in 
NGOs are strongly correlated with high levels of foreign funding (Lyons 
and Nivison-Smith  2008 ). Several qualitative works also suggest that 
interactions with foreign donors can render the internal structures of local 
NGOs more hierarchical, because those NGO leaders who are able to 
“talk the donor’s talk” often acquire disproportionate infl uence over their 
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organizations (Ottaway and Carothers  2000 , pp. 300ff.; Shah  2008 ; Zaidi 
 2006 , p. 3557). Moreover, donor reporting requirements frequently lead 
to the distortion of NGO accountability upward to their donors, at the 
expense of downward accountability towards their benefi ciaries (Edwards 
and Hulme  1996b , p. 254; see also Tandon  1996 ). To date, however, the 
relationship between donor infl uence, internal organizational hierarchies 
and the involvement of civil society groups in patronage and corruption 
has been insuffi ciently explored. 
 The literature on civil society, state weakness and foreign aid, which was 
reviewed for the purposes of this study, is largely silent on how interna-
tional donor support infl uences the way in which civil society actors relate 
to the patterns of violence that can exist in weak states. Some authors have 
noted very generally that foreign donors may protect local civil society 
actors from state repression and threats by political elites (e.g. Carothers 
and Ottaway  2000 , pp. 14f.; Shah  2008 , p. 43). However, scholars have 
also found that foreign-funded civil society groups are sometimes affi liated 
with violent power centres, such as insurgents or warlords, that establish 
civil society organizations in order to be able to engage with the interna-
tional community (e.g. Biró  2007 ). Additional research is thus needed to 
further explore the relationship between civil society, violence and donor 
support in weak states. 
 In summary, a review of the literatures on civil society, governance 
in areas of limited statehood, state weakness, patronage and corruption, 
violent non-state actors and on international development cooperation 
thus suggests an analytical framework consisting of fi ve major categories 
of infl uences on national civil societies in weak states. With regard to the 
national level, these categories are the existence of an environment in which 
non-state actors perform functions usually ascribed to the state ( Sub-chap . 
 2.2 ), the lack of state autonomy and the existence of competition for social 
control between different alternative power centres ( Sub-chap .  2.3 ), a 
context of patronage and corruption ( Sub-chap .  2.4 ) and an environment 
of violence and insecurity ( Sub-chap .  2.5 ). International donor infl uences 
constitute an important intervening variable that can have a signifi cant 
impact on the relationship between civil society and state weakness across 
the four other categories ( Sub-chap .  2.6 ). The following chapters apply 
this analytical framework to Bangladesh and the Philippines. 
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 NOTES 
  1.  For an overview of the democratic functions attributed to NGOs in particu-
lar see for example, Edwards and Hulme ( 1996a ,  b ) and Seckinelgin ( 2002 ). 
  2.  This corresponds with the observation of other authors that the assump-
tion of the existence of a strong state is implicit in many  conventional, 
normative civil society theories, which makes it diffi cult to apply these 
theories to contexts of state weakness (Croissant et al.  2000 , p. 17; Knöbl 
 2006 , p. 13; Shah  2008 ). 
  3.  My defi nition  of the term “alternative power centre” is based on Migdal 
( 1988 ).  It should be noted, however, that Migdal uses the term “power 
centre”, rather than “alternative power centre” and that his defi nition does 
not explicitly refer to “power centres” as “collectives of political and/or 
social elites”. 
  4.  Migdal uses the term “dirty tricks” to describe acts of political violence by 
state elites. 
  5.  For a similar defi nition see for example, Landé ( 1977 , p. xx) and Roniger 
( 2004 , p. 353). Like many other works (e.g. Piattoni  2001a , p. 4; Roniger 
 2004 , p. 354), the present study uses the terms patronage and clientelism 
interchangeably. 
  6.  As cited in Powell ( 1977 , p. 150). 
  7.  On the relationship between the existence of  a restrictive environment and 
the development of internal hierarchies in different types of organizations, 
see also Rueschemeyer ( 1998 , p. 13 f; 16) . 
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